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Abstract
Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructures (AAIs)
are gaining momentum throughout the Internet. Solutions
have been proposed for various scenarios among them
academia, GRID computing, company networks, and above
all eCommerce applications. Products and concepts vary
in architecture, security features, target group, and usabil-
ity containing different strengths and weaknesses. In ad-
dition security needs have changed in communication and
business processes. Security on the internet is no longer de-
fined as only security measures for an eCommerce provider
against an untrustworthy customer but also vice versa.
Consequently, privacy, data canniness, and security are de-
mands in this area.
The authors define criteria for an eCommerce provider
federation using an AAI with a maximum of privacy and
flexibility. The criteria is derived concentrating on b2c
eCommerce applications fulfilling the demands. In addition
to best practices found, XACML policies and an attribute
infrastructure are deployed. Among the evaluated AAIs are
Shibboleth, Microsoft Passport, the Liberty Alliance Frame-
work, and PERMIS.
1. Introduction
The usage of a service on the internet - maybe to buy a
book, or to use a geographic routing service - is not triv-
ial anymore. The purchase of a book is not simply a link
to click on but it stands at the end of a sequel of security
and data intensive processes - most of them hidden from the
user. The business process should be based on a securing
infrastructure. AAIs - Authentication- and Authorisation
Infrastructures - can provide a secure basis for any business
process on the internet. Services start with the identification
and authentication of users, entitle the authorisation of sub-
jects and objects by the owner, can contain the management
of attributes and policies, and lead to access decision mak-
ing and enforcement resulting in an access control of some
kind. Likely structures for AAIs are shown in Figure 1.
Not looking at AAIs holistically is an approach likely to
fail. With the example of PKI we have witnessed that just
putting authentication in the centre of business processes is
too limited. It is not only a question of ones true identity
on the internet but rather a question of rights entitled to a
subject or group [10].
The importance of an AAI also lies in its power to con-
nect business partners together. A resilient and trustworthy
security infrastructure is needed for clients and providers to
exchange any kind of data or to secure information systems
inside a company, among a federated circle of vendors etc.
As security threats to eCommerce providers multiply and
the public attention shifts towards security breaches eCom-
merce vendors are under increasingly pressure to provide
secure services to their customers. Unfortunately security
is not seen or treated as a core competency in eCommerce.
Authentication and authorisation are seen as an enabler.
These enabling services should be provided out-of-the-box
by an eCommerce platform or an application server. On
the other side secure online shopping or service usage is es-
sential for customers trusting a provider. Today’s internet
customers want sophisticated services that guarantee data
security, personal data canniness, privacy, and are transpar-
Figure 1. Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructure with IdP and SP
ent for the user. If desired a Single-Sign-On (SSO) should
be provided that gives access to a federation of providers.
Together with the complexity of business processes on
the internet we see a rise in the need for flexible, dynamic
metadata about subjects and objects. Those attributes con-
tain information about a customer and might be processed
to generate new data - like role membership, consumer be-
haviour, patterns, etc. Attributes are optimal for dynamic
access control decisions building the basis for a role based,
discretionary, or completely attribute based access control
[18, 16].
AAIs could be the solution to mediate between different
stakeholders in questions of data security, privacy, and trust.
Provided that the AAI can gain the trust of users and service
providers it could act as a Public Trustee. As described in
[5] such a trustee could facilitate the feasibility of multilat-
eral security.
Another factor for the promotion of AAIs is the need of
service providers, especially in eCommerce to concentrate
on their core competencies and source out non expertise
fields or services where no additional competitive advan-
tage can be gained. A federation of eCommerce providers
could use a central AAI to outsource security services. As
we have shown in [14] eCommerce among other industries
searches for means to calculate IT risks and security invest-
ments. Joint security services in an AAI can strengthen the
security through specialised AAI providers and at the same
time reduce costs.
Besides inner organisational usage and GRID comput-
ing b2c eCommerce is the main field of activity for AAI
products and projects. This paper analyses security needs in
business-to-consumer eCommerce applications. Of course
AAI research can’t be limited to b2c processes. However,
b2c eCommerce has the advantage of clearly separable, ob-
vious stakeholders and actors (customers, vendors, inter-
mediate service providers) and well defined communication
processes. This allows for a reduction of complexity. Inner
organisational AAIs have special needs as far as IT Gover-
nance is concerned. Rules applying here can be found in
[12] and will be addressed separately.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 require-
ments and criteria are derived from the stakeholders’ de-
mands. Section 3 introduces 4 relevant and leading AAIs.
In section 4 we match their functionalities with our require-
ments. Combining best practices and privacy research a ref-
erence model is derived in section 5 forming the basis of an
AAI fitting our demands. The paper finishes with a conclu-
sion and the outlook for future research and work.
2. Requirements
AAIs are used to connect various actors in communi-
cation processes. For eCommerce in a b2c environment
the two obvious stakeholders are customers and service
providers. In addition external AAI providers should be
taken into consideration. This paper concentrates on three
main demands (privacy, flexibility, and federation). A
broader analysis of demands can be found in [19].
2.1. Privacy
Preserving privacy and customer’s data security seems
contrary to eCommerce vendors’ needs. In eCommerce
customers need to be identified and data is desired to gain
information about product likings, consumer and payment
behaviour. However, this data holds security requirements.
A trade-off has to be made between customer and vendor
concerning essential data and additional consumer informa-
tion [6, 5]. AAIs can mediate in this area of conflict. In
a federation data about a costumer’s payment behaviour or
cross selling could be exchanged. On the other hand an AAI
could let the customer stay under a pseudonym and filter in-
formation. Accordingly the true identity of the customer
is only revealed if legally needed or an actual purchase re-
quires it. Anonymity could be guaranteed via a proxy that
acts on behalf of the customer or - if a direct interaction is
needed - through the usage of anonymous attribute certifi-
cates. These certificates could carry authorisation informa-
tion as well as certify a pseudonym. A protocol to obtain
such certificates is given in [1].
Managing profile data at one central point holds the ben-
efit of making it easier to keep track of stored data and keep-
ing the information up-to-date. Additionally, it enables the
user of an AAI to learn what is stored about his person as
required for example by German law. The user can ask for
the deletion of private data and could also allow what kind
of data from his profile is provided to an eCommerce vendor
in a federation.
The EC’s Data Protection Working Party monitors
closely the functionalities of AAIs and password managers
[4]. The Working Party was founded based on Article
29 of the 95/46/EC Data Protection Directive and refers
to the aforementioned directive as well as the privacy and
telecommunications directive 97/66/EC. Demands include
decentralised storage of personal profile data, data canni-
ness, and the already mentioned option for customers to ac-
cess profile data, control it, and if wanted let it be deleted.
2.2. Flexibility
The process of authenticating and authorising a user
doesn’t stop with identification and the assignment of rights.
AAIs need to be able to manage the whole process as shown
in figure 2.
Figure 2. Simple Access Control
Access decisions should no longer be based on a static
assignment of roles but pay tribute to the dynamic and
changing nature of eCommerce. In addition an eCommerce
federation might feature a huge customer base let alone the
vast potential of customers in the whole World Wide Web.
If access decisions are to be taken they should make use
of the information a customer generates during his mem-
bership. That information could be positive experiences in
his payment behaviour at one vendor or throughout a fed-
eration. Again attribute infrastructures and reasoning tech-
niques would be suitable to handle the amount, variety, and
changing nature of customer data.
2.3. Federation
In the past, processes in b2c eCommerce were structured
like n:1 - meaning that one eCommerce provider had n cus-
tomers that used his services. Of course with the success of
eCommerce a customer soon had accounts at several eCom-
merce providers. Problems like the maintaining of all these
accounts, different levels of security at each vendor, security
breaches etc. occurred. eCommerce providers missed the
interconnection of user data to fight fraud and gain compet-
itive data. Consequently, the idea of federations was born.
Ideally providers are joined together in a structure like n:m
meaning in a federation each vendor providing different or
complementary services. If common services like a cus-
tomer database are outsourced a structure like n:1:m devel-
ops (figure 1). AAIs can provide their service as a central
point of security, authentication, and authorisation in these
federations. Two main factors promote the usage of AAI
federations in b2c eCommerce. First the additional amount
and quality of information about a customer and second the
possibility to outsource non core competencies like security
features to a trusted partner. As far as AAIs are concerned it
is possible for the eCommerce provider to outsource every
step from authentication to the enforcement of access con-
trol decisions to the AAI. In this scenario the AAI would
work as a proxy server for the entire communication.
3. Leading AAIs
In 2005 we have analysed seven major AAIs [19]. As
shown in [19] four AAIs are especially relevant in b2c
eCommerce in consideration of privacy, flexibility, and fed-
erations: the Web-Focused AAIs Shibboleth, Microsoft
Passport, the Liberty Alliance Framework and the PMI
PERMIS.
3.1. Shibboleth
Shibboleth is an AAI from the U.S. Internet2 Organiza-
tion connecting over 200 American universities [2].
In Shibboleth each university can alternately be service
(SP) or identity provider (IdP). A student from university A
trying to gain access to a resource at university B will be
asked by the SP to name his or her IdP (home university A)
via a so called Where-Are-You-From-Server. The IdP au-
thenticates the user acknowledging this process via a SAML
response. Privacy is respected in Shibboleth twofold. First
the request is anonymous and second the user decides in his
Shibboleth profile what kind of attribute he wants passed
along The identity of the user is not revealed but a dynamic
handle is generated identifying the request. The Shibboleth
SP asks the IdP for further attributes about the user using
them to compute and enforce an access control decision.
Shibboleth doesn’t specify the means of authentication and
the access control. Each member can use whatever mecha-
nism seems fit to them or is already in place, therefore re-
ducing the contribution of Shibboleth to a system of part-
ners that trust each other as far as the authentication mech-
anism is concerned and for the dispersal of attributes.
3.2. Microsoft Passport
Microsoft Passport, although often criticised, is the first
and was the largest commercial AAI so far. Passport con-
centrates on Single-Sign-On (SSO) for the user who gets
is passport account with every hotmail account. Passport
relies heavily on the usage of cookies imitating to some ex-
tend Kerberos’s ticket functionalities. The login to a SP is
redirected to Passport requiring his username and password.
The SP’s ID is transmitted via URL encoding enabling Pass-
port to redirect the client and storing several cookies. At the
SP a software is needed - the so called Passport-Manager.
This software reads URL encoded data and stores additional
cookies into the SP’s domain permitting an access control
decision. At another vendor the passport cookies are used
to enable a SSO [11]. The vendor decides about access of
resources using his authorisation and access control mech-
anism of choice. Passport is a SSO system meaning that it
only asserts the user’s authentication.
Passport uses a central database to keep all client infor-
mation, a matter of discussion in recent years. In addition
the Microsoft policy of so called ”security through obscu-
rity”, not providing consistent information about the stored
data and its protection is widely criticised. Several security
vulnerabilities were found and fixed in the past [7]. Pass-
port’s future is uncertain. After most of its main clients
abandoned it (e.g. eBay in 2004) rumours are that it will
be used only internally for Microsoft services or integrated
into an existing web based service.
3.3. The Liberty Alliance Framework
Liberty was the open source community’s answer to Mi-
crosoft Passport in 2001. Governmental and Non-Profit or-
ganisations as well as well know IT players like SUN or
IBM are building the consortium. In Liberty a Circle of
Trust (COT) establishes a Liberty system [8, 9]. Each part-
ner provides the authentication for his users with his own
methods while they themselves can login to all other part-
ners in a SSO. The user authenticates at his IdP and if he
wishes a cookie is stored under a common domain where
every member hosts a server so they all can access the
cookie. If a user moves to a COT member the cookie is
read, the IdP asked for appropriate authentication, and an
assertion is awaited. Communication is based on the SAML
protocol.
Liberty resembles more a framework than an actual AAI.
A COT has to decide on the implementations. The cre-
ation of a COT has to be planned carefully due to its open-
ness. The SAML assertions can carry any attribute the COT
agrees upon. Liberty is distributed. The IdP is not fixed like
in Shibboleth or centralised like in passport. It is possible
to login at different points of the COT thus resulting e.g. in
different user names or attributes that are transferred. The
identity of the user is not revealed in the process of requests
and assertions.
3.4. PERMIS
The EU project PERMIS [3] is closely integrated into
the target system. This can be e.g. an apache web server.
Instead of using the apache security functionality like .htac-
cess PERMIS is used to derive the role name of a user and
a PERMIS policy is used to control access. The target ap-
plication is also responsible for user authentication as PER-
MIS is authentication agnostic.
PERMIS uses X.509 attribute certificates (AC). These
bind the distinguished name of the user to a role. An XML
policy authorises roles and targets. ACs and their revocation
lists are stored in LDAP directories. If a user wants access
to a target the PERMIS access control enforcement func-
tion will delegate his request to the access control decision
function which determines the correctness of the AC and its
compliance to the policy. If access is granted the decision
is given back to the enforcement function which grants the
access or not.
The centrally stored ACs can contain any information
an Attribute Authority has assigned. Of course different
authorities can work together creating an attribute storage
LDAP. Attributes are validated via the authorities’ signa-
tures. The decision and enforcement functions have to be
implemented into the web server at the SP.
4. Matching AAIs and Requirements
4.1. Privacy
Shibboleth doesn’t disclose the user’s real name and he
or she can decide what kind of attributes can be passed
along. However, all of these available attributes are pro-
vided whether or not needed for an access control decision.
A real name or address is never needed. However, if a situ-
ation would occur in which the user would have to disclose
his or her real name to the vendor, a matching could be made
to all available attributes.
In Passport the user needs to trust Microsoft to not mis-
use his data. This data consists of his profile and also his
customer behaviour. However, the user has no opportunity
to see, control, let alone delete this information. Microsoft
does not even have a privacy policy. The cookies stored
contain profile data the user cannot decide upon.
Liberty, with a decentralised structure and a focus on
just authentication, naturally opposes Microsoft. As several
possibilities to enter the COT are possible a SP can just be
sure that the actual IdP has authenticated the user. Different
usernames and profile information can be given and never-
theless federated in Liberty. However, a COT can decide to
exchange attributes of the user. Again, due to the distributed
nature it is nevertheless impossible to be sure to gather all
bargain relevant attributes at all federated partners. To be
fair the Liberty framework is just a framework indeed with
guidelines for an actual implementation. No Liberty system
equals the other and users should be careful to look at the
privacy policy of the system in question.
PERMIS uses just a distinguished name (DN) for the
storage and retrieval of attributes. Privacy can be guaran-
teed if the certificates are bound to a pseudonym and the
authentication disables a matching between name and DN.
As certificates are publicly available and the content is not
encrypted a provider or attacker getting the DN can access
all available attributes. This is again an unnecessary disclo-
sure of personal information.
4.2. Flexibility
As shown, AAIs should provide methods to manage
the entire process of authentication and authorisation. At-
tributes and the inference of attributes with rules are the
most flexible solution to deduce access rights or role mem-
berships. To conclude a trusted access control decision all
necessary attributes but not more should be compiled and
the appropriate rules should be executed.
Unfortunately none of the analysed AAIs uses an at-
tribute infrastructure to manage dynamic information about
subjects and objects. PERMIS makes use of sophisticated
certificates able to hold any attribute imaginable but uses
the data only to store the user’s role name for a resource.
Shibboleth, Passport and Liberty could provide the service
provider with any kind of data through SAML assertions
or the cookie stored data but it is not used for more then
role transportation. Furthermore there is not filtering of at-
tributes to the actual need.
Shibboleth relies entirely on the authentication and ac-
cess control mechanisms in place of its partners. Due to
its historical background the systems in use at universities
are not touched. The allocated attributes however are stan-
dardised. Therefore the subject authorisation can be called
”guided” by Shibboleth.
Passport is a SSO system taking care of authentication
for its vendors. Authorisation and access control still have
to be managed by the SPs. Profile data is accessible but not
filtered for the SP.
Liberty like Passport provides a SSO. The roles of SP
and IdP change but could also be hold simultaneously by a
COT partner. Attributes can be transferred but again there is
no filtering. Another drawback for flexible attribute based
authorisation is the uncertainty to accumulate all attributes.
PERMIS is authentication agnostic depending therefore
on another system. The access control decision is made and
enforced by PERMIS. Attributes are gathered and managed
by the system, however PERMIS in its current state is role
based, meaning that attributes are role names for various
resources. The correctness of attributes is guaranteed by
an attribute authority; as is the policy in use. Flexibility
as far as targets are concerned is limited due to the close
integration of PERMIS into the target.
4.3. Federation
The term federation for b2c eCommerce applications has
been coined especially in the Liberty project. Together with
Shibboleth and Passport federations are a key element in
these AAIs. The potential to outsource customer data and
security problems is least developed and intended in Shib-
boleth. Passport as a commercial SSO provider naturally
provides SPs with the most potential to outsource AAI ele-
ments. PERMIS again needs an authentication mechanism.
This provided it could be a suitable AAI for a federation if
the limitation of the close integration into the target server
is acceptable.
5. Reference model
Our proposed reference architecture can be seen in fig-
ure 3. The architecture enables the process of requesting
a resource as given in figure 4. The starting point is the
user’s request. In the event of a request (step 1 in figure 3)
the user is redirected to the AAI’s central authentication and
authorisation service (step 2) carrying wit him some kind of
resource ID. The system grants or denies the requested ac-
tion. User involvement is needed only to authenticate (step
3). Entities involved are the user, the federation member
who’s resource is requested, and the AAI including means
to store and alter user data, attributes, and policies.
We will sketch out the entire process of authentication
and access control using an attribute infrastructure and poli-
cies to derive an access control decision. To formulate rules
and policies (accumulation of rules) XACML - the eXten-
sible Access Control Markup Language has become stan-
dard [15]. Inference algorithms compute attributes of sub-
jects and objects to decide whether or not access is granted.
XACML can also be used to deduce role memberships from
attributes. It might be possible to compute all the customers
purchasing events resulting in a role membership granting
for example rebates or special payment options. For every
Figure 3. AAI Reference Architecture with Attribute Infrastructure
Figure 4. Reference Model, needed AAI pro-
cesses
step we will look at the introduced AAIs and decide if a
best practice approach is to be found. In addition the po-
tential of the technologies mentioned above are taken into
consideration.
5.1 Authentication
For our reference model we decided to use username and
password or a PKI certificate with pseudonyms to guarantee
privacy (step 3 in figure 3).
Widely promoted but seldom used PKI was supposed to
be the solution of choice for authentication but only PER-
MIS recommends the usage of PKI as authenticator. Due to
its advantages we recommend the usage of PKI for our ref-
erence model in the case where no anonymity is desired or a
certificate using a pseudonym rather then a real name. How-
ever, due to PKI’s disadvantages the usage of usernames and
strong passwords [10] seems more likely. An AAI provider
could act as a Certificate Authority but more realistically an
existing third party PKI would be used.
5.2 Authorisation
We have decided on an attribute based access control
model therefore needing a corresponding authorisation pro-
cess.
Vendors authorise users via the creation of policies and
attribute assignments to their resources. Clients can have
attributes per se (creation of a new account), explicitly as-
signed by the vendor, or derived from their behaviour or
features (age, location, and alike).
In Shibboleth the users’ roles are passed along from the
IdP to the SP. The Shibboleth role is derived from his po-
sition at the IdP (his home university), however, the role is
static and the roles rather trivial (student, employee, ...).
As shown in Figure 4 the authorisation is not part of the
direct process of requesting a resource. Naturally authori-
sation happens prior to the access request. Authorisation
has to be done for subjects requesting and objects being re-
quested. In our reference architecture attributes are assigned
to users and resources. These attributes have to be compli-
ant with the XACML policy in use. A federation needs to
agree on a set of attributes. As [16] has shown attributes can
derive from an ontology or even be deducted from unstruc-
tured information.
Attributes about a user can be hold either centrally (as
given in figure 3), locally at the vendors site, or hybrid stor-
ing the attributes partly centrally and to some extend at the
vendors site. As the user may have experiences and ac-
counts at different federation’s vendors, in an extreme case
locally means at m sites (m being the number of vendors in
a federation).
The attributes for resources are stored locally at the re-
spective vendor’s site. They are collected in the access
control process. As a storage format PERMIS proposes
X.509 attribute certificates. However, these certificates do
not comply fully with the ITU-T standard. In [13] we have
shown a fully compliant prototype to generate, delegate,
and manage X.509 attribute certificates.
The rules to access a resource are put together into poli-
cies. Again policies can be stored in three different ways:
first, completely central at one of the AAI servers (again see
Figure 3 for an example), second, locally at the vendor’s
site or third, a centrally stored master policy is enhanced
by more detailed and individual policies from the respec-
tive vendor. As an example the AAI server could gather the
user’s payment behaviour from every federation member,
translate the events with a common policy to a user class
(e.g. gold user, standard user, etc.). The local policy would
then state whether for a resource of a certain value he is
privileged to pay by invoice, credit card or gets a discount.
5.3 Access Control
Our reference architecture uses XACML policies to de-
cide on access.
In our model access control is split into policy decision
and policy enforcement - as usual in attribute based access
control schemes. Using attributes and a policy to decide
on access rights, the place of decision and enforcement can
differ. Taking the example above an eCommerce provider
who forwarded a request to the AAI takes the decis ion and
enforces it with its own means - e.g. the Apache build in
access control functionalities. This would be the usual sce-
nario. Using the AAI’s central server as a proxy is the other
option (figure 5). The request for a resource and the de-
nial of access would be handled by this server. However,
the feasibility is questionable. The proxy becomes a single-
point-of-failure and a bottleneck for the entire federation.
Our model makes use of a sophisticated attribute infras-
tructure. The AAI pulls from the vendor’s or his central
database attributes about the user and the resource (steps
4 and 5 in figure 3). This process can be quite complex.
To ensure that no data about prior purchases are transferred
from one federation member to the other the AAI has to col-
lect all attributes. It would be unjustifiable to let a vendor
retrieve all attributes from his partners thereby gaining un-
necessarily knowledge about the user. The AAI asks every
provider if he is in possession of attributes. The AAI has to
ensure that all available attributes are processed otherwise
no reliable decision can be taken.
Next the AAI needs to assemble the needed policies (step
6). Afterwards the access control decision is computed. The
outcome of the decision (can subject A access object B each
with the corresponding attributes under the rules in policy
C) is either Yes, No, or N.A. The latter needing some sort
of special handling.
The need to protect private data from other vendors in a
federation is very well respected in Liberty. However, Lib-
erty can not guarantee the complete pooling of attributes
due to its heavily distributed architecture. There are m-1
ways to authenticate at the vendor’s site coming from an-
other partner in the federation. Accordingly there are m-1
possible attribute collections to hand over.
5.4 Privacy
Privacy is a question of knowledge of user data. There-
fore it is crucial to know which entity in our model knows
what. Obviously the vendor is informed about the client’s
purchases at his site. He knows neither about his client’s
purchases nor about other actions at his federation partners.
The AAI pulls the attributes, events and status information
and hands back only a filtered result or if the PDP is com-
pletely centralised the vendor just gets to know the policy
decision. If not evitable (e.g. mailing of goods) the user can
act anonymously in the federation or under a pseudonym.
The AAI can be a point of attribute verification by the
user. As required by law user information can be accessed
by the user and deleted if desired. We are aware of the prob-
lem of negative attributes. If a user knows that attributes are
stored about him that lower his credibility he would erase
his account and try to create a new, unburdened one. There-
fore it is necessary to discard the idea of negative attributes
and rather use positive attributes that improve an initially
sceptical rating of the client.
6. Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have analysed the demands on AAIs
in business-to-consumer eCommerce as far as the building
of a federation, flexibility, and privacy are concerned. Af-
ter defining the criteria we matched them with four AAIs
namely Shibboleth, Microsoft Passport, the Liberty Al-
liance Framework, and PERMIS. None of the analysed so-
lutions are currently able to attain our goals. As far as flex-
ibility is concerned the solutions are missing the dynamic
and complexity of eBusiness. We have introduced the idea
to use an attribute based access control mechanisms with
XACML policies for that. To assure benefits from a fed-
eration we combined the benefits of a central SSO solution
like Passport with those of the distributed solution Liberty.
PERMIS provided mechanisms to outsource almost every
part of the access control process to an AAI. The usage of a
common vocabulary has been implemented with success in
Shibboleth. We have adopted the idea and promote a wider
usage of attributes for the access control. Our distributed
AAI respecting privacy and flexibility is an improvement
among existing AAIs and AAI concepts in respect to our de-
mands. The produced model so far has been tailored to b2c
eCommerce. The next steps in our work will be to broaden
the field of application. GRID computing and inner organi-
sational usage will be targeted next. As a proof of concept
the described solution is currently implemented using the
Figure 5. AAI with Attribute Infrastructure acting as a Proxy
Liberty Framework and the ABAC model from [18, 16, 17]
as a basis.
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